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Tanjung Lesung Special Economic Zone: 
Expectation and Reality
Abstract
Many countries have developed Special Economic Zones (SEZ) to spur 
economic growth. In Indonesia, SEZs have been around for more than a 
decade. However, the existing SEZs have not yielded the expected results. 
Likewise with the Tanjung Lesung Tourism SEZ, which is still facing major 
obstacles in its development. Studies related to the dimensions of the SEZ 
policy have not been fully carried out, specifically those related to local 
government involvement. This study aimed to analyze government policy 
in supporting the development of SEZ, particularly in Tanjung Lesung. 
This study used a descriptive method with a qualitative approach. This 
study showed the many obstacles faced for the development of the 
Tanjung Kelayang SEZ, both of which stem from the weak commitment 
of the parties involved. Their attitude of blaming each other needs to 
be changed with the teamwork spirit of working together and creating 
synergy. Each party seems to wait for each other to make the first move. 
The limited resources and capabilities caused the policy implementation 
to come to a halt. The role of the Area Council (Dewan Kawasan) needs 
to be further optimized to solve problems at the local level. With better 
information, the central government, through the Directorate General of 
Territorial Administration Development, Ministry of Home Affairs, can 
play a more pivotal role in providing strategic considerations in driving 
the progress of SEZ. 
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The Special Economic 
Zone is a popular instrument 
in the modern economy that is 
aimed to encourage economic 
growth.  The concept of SEZ is 
generally known as regional 
economics. This concept was 
initially developed in Shannon, 
Ireland, and subsequently spread 
to other regions such as Asia, 
Latin America, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Indonesia. 
As of 2019, there are 5,400 
SEZs in the world. A total of 1,000 
SEZs have been established in the 
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past five years, and approximately 500 SEZs will 
soon be established. 94% of the 5,400 SEZs are in 
developing countries, while in developed countries 
the number of SEZs is merely approximately 6% 
(United Nations Conference on Trade, 2019).  The 
latest data also states that the average area of  SEZs 
in the world is 905 hectares. The largest SEZ is in 
Vietnam, reaching 58 thousand hectares (Ishida, 
2015, p. 27). The problems faced by the SEZs are 
quite diverse, ranging from difficulties in land 
acquisition, the influence of the global economy, to 
having to compete with other SEZs. In Asia, China has 
the highest number of SEZs, with a total of 2,543 SEZs 
(Dodwell, 2019). At the time of this study, Indonesia 
has 15 SEZs. Sei Mangkei and Tanjung Lesung are the 
earliest SEZs established and have been operating 
since 2015 (Olivia, 2020). The number of Indonesia’s 
SEZs are relatively low compared to other ASEAN 
countries, such as the Philippines, which has 
532 SEZs, and Cambodia, which has 35 SEZs. 
 (Ishida, 2015).
Law No. 25/2007 concerning investment 
stated the term “SEZ” for the first time in 
Indonesia. SEZs are intended to accelerate 
economic development in strategic areas and to 
maintain the balance of regional development. SEZ 
policy was strengthened by Law No. 39 of 2009 
concerning Special Economic Zones, along with 
supporting regulations in the form of Government 
Regulations, Presidential Regulations, Presidential 
Decrees, and several Ministerial Regulations.
However, no matter how supportive the 
regulations are, none of the Indonesian SEZs 
perform well; they even tend to perform quite the 
opposite (Uli, 2019). The Coordinating Ministry 
for Economic Affairs recorded that the national 
investment value target of all SEZs reached IDR 85.3 
trillion as of October 2019. Of those, only IDR.22.2 
trillion was realized, with a workforce absoIDRtion 
of around 8,686 people (Olivia, 2019).  
The Tanjung Lesung SEZ that was set in 
2012 was also facing a similar outcome. Located 
at the westernmost tip of Java, the Tanjung Lesung 
SEZ, Banten, is the first Tourism SEZ that operates 
in February 2015. It has an area of  1,500 Hectares 
and is located approximately 170 km southwest 
of Jakarta, in Tanjungjaya Village, Panimbang 
District, Pandeglang Regency, Banten Province. 
Since its inauguration in 2014, the Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ has made no visible progress. At the 
time of the study, the Tanjung Lesung SEZ had 
made no visible progress since its inauguration in 
2014 (Mulyawati et al., 2019). Between 2015-2018 
the growth of tourist visits was approximately an 
average of 37.02% per year. However, between 
2017-2018, its growth declined to approximately 
14.63% per year. The decline in the number of 
tourist visits worsened after the tsunami on 
December 22, 2018. For example, based on the 
data as of April 2019, the occupancy of hotel 
rooms at Tanjung Lesung Resort and Beach Club is 
only 1-3 rooms per week between January- April 
2019.   Likewise , several tourist destinations 
such as the Resort and Beach Club, Bodur Beach, 
Tanjung Kuntianak Beach, and Cipenyu Beach 
were empty of visitors (Mulyawati et al., 2019). 
Data from Banten West Java (BWJ) also 
shows the same situation, even though there 
was an increase in the number of visitors; 
from January 2019 to June 2019, no significant 
changes were seen. As a result, the 2019 tax 
revenue from the tourism sector in Pandeglang 
District had decreased dramatically (If, 2019). 
Until the third quarter of 2019, the local tax 
revenue in Pandeglang District only reached 
IDR 34 billion, while the target was IDR 48 
billion. The tax revenue was derived from 11 
types of regional taxes (Kabar Banten, 2019). 
Because of its disappointing performance, Banten 
Governor Wahidin Halim requested President 
Joko Widodo to revoke the Tanjung Lesung SEZ 
permit. Furthermore, Wahidin also argued that 
the progress did not go according to plan and did 
not match the target (Ulum, 2018).
There were several studies related to the 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ conducted by Kartini (2019), 
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Kartini et al. (2017), as well as Meliana and 
Buchori (2016). The three studies concluded that 
the Tanjung Lesung SEZ did not show significant 
development, and some problems were identified. 
For example, Kartini (2019) mapped conflicts 
that occurred between the developer and the 
local residents. Likewise, Kartini et al. (2017) 
stated that the regional government policies were 
pragmatic and have not provided a solution for 
the development of SEZs. These problems are 
reinforced by the results of a study by Meliana 
and Buchori (2016), which mentions that regional 
government institutions in the development of 
SEZs (concerning the main tasks and functions of 
the Zone Council through the Secretariat of the SEZ 
Zone Council, SEZ Administrators, and Business 
Entities) were ineffective, especially related to 
coordination communication, supervision, and 
reporting. 
Another study on SEZ was conducted by 
Rustidja, Purnamawati, and Setiawati (2017), 
which provided an analysis of the Mandalika 
and Bitung SEZ strategies. The Mandalika 
SEZ emphasizes the strategy of promoting its 
competitiveness and its tourism networks.  While 
Bitung is more focused on promotional strategies 
to increase its logistics-value-added, benefit, and 
industrial supply chains, a study by Darmastuti, 
Afrimadona, and Kurniawan (2018) compared 
the management of SEZs in China and Indonesia. 
According to the study, the success story of China’s 
SEZs were due to the high commitment from both 
the central and regional governments to develop 
the regions that are already designated as SEZs. 
The study also concluded that the government’s 
coordinative ability was very important for the 
success of SEZs. Furthermore, SEZs in China 
succeed because they were under centralized 
control, a government system that tends to be 
authoritarian. Thus, compliance in advancing the 
SEZ is higher. 
Studies on SEZs are also the focus of 
researchers throughout the world. Saeed (2019) 
discussed Oman’s strategy in the development 
of SEZs in Duqm. Duqm is the largest SEZ in the 
Middle East and North Africa, which combines 
eight business areas, such as the heavy-medium 
and light industrial complex, port, dry dock, oil 
refinery, tourism area, logistics service area, 
regional airport, and commercial housing area. 
The study concluded that many incentives 
were provided for investors, such as income tax 
exemption for up to 30 years, extendable for 
similar periods. Other incentives were 100% 
of land owned by foreign investors, easy labor 
recruitment, and the import of raw materials into 
the tax-free zone Duqm SEZ was an ideal example 
of an integrated SEZ. Another study related to SEZ 
in the world was conducted by Moberg (2015), 
which concluded that a strong political economy 
in SEZ policy depends on the strong institutional 
capacity, which was responsible for controlling 
fair incentives for the government and private 
sector involved, and the transfer of knowledge to 
stakeholders in a balanced and accurate manner 
to limit the possibility of corrupt behavior.
Wong and Buba (2017) also examined the 
impact of SEZ operations in the world. Their 
study concluded that tax relief, independent 
regulation, and national-level licensing agencies 
that ensured the principle of the one-stop-shop 
licensing were the most influential factors in the 
progress of SEZs. Likewise, legal land acquisition 
is important in establishing SEZs. Similar to 
Wong, a study by Zeng (2019) concluded that the 
success of SEZ implementation depends on the 
existence of a firm and clear regulatory framework 
(especially regarding the government and private 
task force), the existence of a strategic plan and 
business feasibility review, the availability of 
good infrastructure, and the establishment of 
environmental and social responsibility standards.
This study reviewed government policies, 
especially those of the local government, to 
encourage the growth of the SEZs. This study 
also provided an overview of the policies of the 
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Ministry of Home Affairs as a Member of the Zone 
Council. The results of the study are expected to 
provide input in the form of any policies that can 
be optimized by stakeholders to encourage the 
progress of SEZs, including the resources and 
capabilities needed to do so. 
This paper is divided into four parts: 
introduction, methodology, results and discussion, 
and conclusion. The result and discussion 
includes three sub-topics: (i) the role of regional 
governments in supporting the development 
of SEZs; (ii) the obstacles and challenges faced 
by local governments to optimize the SEZ in 
supporting regional economic progress; and 
(iii) an analysis of the role of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs in the SEZ National Council. The 
final section offers conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
Methods
This study focuses on regional government 
policy in encouraging the implementation of the 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ. This study used a descriptive 
method with a qualitative approach. This was a 
suitable  approach since the policy on SEZ was 
multidimensional (Alwasilah, 2003). To describe 
this phenomenon, the perceptions of the various 
parties involved were examined and a review of 
various supporting documents on SEZ policies 
was conducted. The data collection consisted of 
using an in-depth interview technique and group 
discussions. Secondary data was obtained from 
electronic and physical documents as well as 
news in the mainstream mass media to enrich 
the analysis. Field research was conducted during 
February-March 2020.
Results and Discussion
Tanjung Lesung was designated a National 
Tourism Strategic Area (KSPN) in Government 
Regulation No. 50 of 2011 concerning the 
National Tourism Development Master Plan 
(RIPPARNAS). The Tanjung Lesung SEZ was 
initiated in 2012 with the issuance of Government 
Regulation No. 26 of 2012 concerning the 
Tanjung Lesung Special  Economic Zone. 
 The underlying reason for the SEZ was to 
accelerate economic development in the region, 
as well as support the acceleration and expansion 
of national economic development. The regulation 
also stated that the formation of the Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ was proposed by PT Banten West Java 
Tourism Development Corporation (BWJ) and has 
fulfilled the criteria, as stipulated in Article 4 of 
Law No. 39 of 2009 concerning Special Economic 
Zones and Article 7 of PP No. 2 of 2011 concerning 
the Operation of SEZs. 
In 2016, Tanjung Lesung was promoted to 
become a leading destination by being designated 
as one of the 10 new tourist destinations. The 
number of tourist arrivals to Tanjung Lesung 
reached 570,000 in 2016 (kek.go.id, 2019). In 
2017, the central government prioritized four 
out of the ten destinations and Tanjung Lesung 
was not one of them, although it had a target of 
6.1 million tourists when fully operational, which 
was originally planned in 2020.
To support the SEZ, PT BWJ built supporting 
facilities such as fiber-optic telecommunications, 
electricity networks with a capacity of 10 MW, 
water infrastructure, and wastewater treatment 
plants. Tourist attractions will also be built, such 
as a motor circuit track in an area of  50 hectares. 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ has an investment area of  256 
hectares, or approximately 17% of the total area 
of  1500 hectares owned. The SEZ is also claimed 
to have a potential investment of 2019-2021 
of IDR 5.95 trillion. The site plan combined the 
nuances of Bali and Venice (jababeka.com, 2019). 
The advantage of the Tanjung Lesung SEZ is its 
location close to the iconic Ujung Kulon National 
Park, the only park in the world that has a rare 
one-horned rhinoceros. This potential needs to 
be the main focus for the SEZ to attract tourists 
(Bagiryan et al., 2018).
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The Role of The Regional Government 
The 2016-2021 Regional Medium-Term 
Development Plan (RPJMD) of Pandeglang District 
and the 2017-2022 Banten Province RPJMD did 
not specifically mention the development of the 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ. The Provincial Government 
of Banten regulates Tanjung Lesung and its 
surroundings in Perda No. 6 of 2019 concerning 
the Provincial Tourism Development Master 
Plan (RIPPARPROV) of Banten as the leading 
destination in the provincial tourism development 
area. The regulation mentioned 11 strategic 
tourism destinations, including Tanjung Lesung. 
However, of the nine tourism development 
destinations, Tanjung Lesung was not included. 
Thus, it can be concluded that Tanjung Lesung was 
not part of the regional development priorities. 
Focus in the Buffer Area
In the development of the Tanjung Lesung 
area and its surroundings, the Provincial 
Government and the Regency Government 
mapped the Tanjung Lesung area into two 
zones: the core zone and the buffer zone. The 
development of the core zone Tanjung Lesung SEZ, 
covering an area of  1500 hectares, was carried 
out by PT. BWJ. The regional governments, both 
the district and provincial governments, consider 
that they have no authority to intervene in the 
development of the core zone area. 
The regional government focused on the 
development in the buffer zone in four sub-
districts: Panimbang, Sobang, Cigeulis, and 
Sukaresmi. Until 2019, the provincial government 
claimed to have provided a budget of IDR 74.4 
billion to carry out activities such as training, 
technical guidance, managing the Tanjung Lesung 
Festival, building the Cikadu village road, Detail 
Engineering Design (DED) for the water source, 
signage, street lights, and construction of the 
Tourism Police Station. 
Meanwhile,  the Pandeglang district 
government stated that it  supported the 
development of the buffer zone with a total 
budget of IDR 84.9 billion. The funds were 
used for tourism training (souvenirs, culinary, 
homestay, permits, sapta pesona, business 
partnerships, agro-tourism, guides, hospitality), 
the construction of the Panimbang terminal, the 
construction of the fish market and outlets, and 
also the re-arrangement of the Panimbang market 
(Nurhayadi et al., 2018). 
To boost the number of visits to the Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ, the Pandeglang District government 
built and developed several destinations in the 
surrounding area as follows: (i) re-structured 
the destinations of the Sawer Curug and Citoe 
Beach, in Cigeulis District; (ii) established 
destination governance forums; (iii) empowered 
people through homestays; and (iv) developed 
digital destinations in the Cikadu Batik Market. 
The Pandeglang government also organized the 
Tanjung Lesung Festival and the development 
of the Ujung Kulon Geopark. These efforts were 
expected to attract tourists to visit the SEZ. 
Post-Tsunami, to encourage the economic 
recovery, socialization related to Tanjung Lesung’s 
readiness also continued to be carried out by the 
district government. At the time of the study, the 
Tanjung Lesung Region was considered to be the 
most prepared to face disaster. To prepare Tanjung 
Lesung against earthquakes, tsunamis, and coastal 
abrasion, a reliable early warning system was built 
with the help of the Meteorology, Climatology, and 
Geophysics Agency (BMKG) and support from 
the government of Germany. However, the early 
warning sirens that are in the buffer zone had 
not functioned yet.  Evacuation structures in the 
tsunami-prone areas outside of SEZ were also not 
yet available Adjustments to building structures 
for earthquake resistance was only carried out 
within the SEZ. The rapid coastal abrasion caused 
buildings and infrastructure located in coastal 
zones prone to tidal flooding and suffered from 
a tsunami. To minimize the impact of tsunamis, 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ also installed tsunami buoys 
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and tools to measure water levels. Several tsunami 
shelters were also installed. 
The central government also provides 
support related to the supply of clean water. At 
present, clean water used both in SEZ and buffer 
zones comes from groundwater, where excessive 
use will threaten the environmental sustainability 
of the region. Waste management in the SEZ and 
buffer zone also relied on the Pandeglang District 
landfill, whose processing system was in the form 
of open dumping. 
In general, the Tanjung Lesung SEZ was 
considered to have the worst performance of 
the other Tourism SEZs and has a fairly slow 
development progress. (Maftuhah, 2017, p. 
132). The development of the buffer zone area 
should be anticipated so that the SEZ impact 
is felt by the surrounding community. The 
construction of homestays and restaurants in 
buffer zones is a small-scale investment.  However, 
if the accessibility policy towards the SEZ is not 
resolved, the development of the surrounding 
area is also not optimal. The situation during the 
study was that economic growth starts from the 
periphery of SEZ through the empowerment of 
small-scale investment (Ramadhiani, 2016).
The development of small and medium 
industries (IKM) is also being encouraged, as well 
as culinary business groups. Pandeglang District 
government believes that the SEZ affects the 
emergence of 3,857 MSMEs, with an estimated 
turnover of around IDR 51.3 billion (Oktaviana, 
2016). 
The SEZ Tanjung Lesung provides a small 
contribution. In fact, it can be said that it has 
no effect on the Original Regional Income of 
Pandeglang Regency. The manager of Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ is still in the development stage even 
though a decade has passed. The innovation 
and promotion of SEZ Tanjung Lesung is still 
a discourse; likewise with infrastructure 
development that continues to be carried out 
but does not necessarily increase tourist visits. 
Although the data on the number of tourist visits 
has increased, the percentage of visits is very low. 
On the other hand, there is still a lack of investors 
investing their capital, resulting in a lack of funds 
in tourism development.
Neither local governments nor managers 
seem to understand community empowerment 
through the complex relationships between 
b i o d i v e r s i t y  c o n s e r v a t i o n ,  l i v e l i h o o d 
enhancement and tourism development , 
including: empowerment, capacity building, 
economic benefits, conservation of biodiversity 
and environmental services, and the development 
of facilities (Nyaupane & Poudel, 2011, p. 1359). 
Yet tourism and conservation activities provide 
many opportunities for skills development, 
income, and leadership training for local residents. 
The Tanjung Lesung SEZ has not yet become 
the main source of income for the Pandeglang 
Regency. Many government-driven programs also 
do not automatically improve the livelihoods of 
local people. Thus, local community investment 
is only in the bufferzone with small funds, so that 
they are unable to provide great control over the 
area.
Tourism also does not yet provide access 
to information and facilities, and promotes 
conservation education and awareness among 
local residents. This can help change the attitudes 
of local communities towards the conservation 
of flora and fauna, reduce dependence on natural 
resources, and promote the conservation of 
biodiversity. Likewise, the conservation of 
biodiversity and natural resources provides 
environmental services to local people and can be 
a major tourist attraction that is a major driver of 
conservation. The two-way relationship between 
biodiversity conservation, improved livelihoods, 
and tourism development has not really occurred.
Issues in Developing the SEZ 
The slow development of Tanjung Lesung 
SEZ was due to the low investment attractiveness 
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(Pebrianto, 2018). There were many factors 
involved, such as infrastructure and accessibility, 
incentive guarantees, land issues, and synergy 
between SEZ management.
 
Infrastructure and Accessibility 
The main obstacle for the Tanjung Lesung 
SEZ was the access routes to the area, which takes 
about seven hours of travel time from Jakarta. 
Ideally, the road to SEZ should be no more than 
two hours from the nearest airport. There was 
nothing much that the regional government 
and PT BWJ could do about this situation. They 
hoped that the central government’s promise to 
build the Serang-Panimbang Toll Road and South 
Banten Airport would be fulfilled soon.  The 83.6 
km Serang-Panimbang Toll Road would provide 
access to the Tanjung Lesung SEZ and Ujung Kulon 
National Park. 
According to the SEZ National Council, 
originally PT,  BWJ has never asked for the 
support ing  tol l  road,  a irport ,  or  other 
infrastructure. These supports were being 
intensively requested at the time of the study. 
Finally, the central government included the 
Serang-Panimbang toll road as one of the National 
Strategic Projects based on Presidential Regulation 
No. 56 of 2018 concerning the Acceleration of the 
Implementation of the National Strategic Project. 
Toll road construction will be carried out in three 
sections. Section I of Serang-Rangkasbitung is 
26.5 km, section II Rangkasbitung - Cileles is 
21.17 km, and section III Cileles - Panimbang is 
33 km (Indraini, 2020). In reality, the toll road 
construction progress was lagging from the target. 
The Section I Toll Road Construction Section I was 
forced to be delayed, and the target was shifted to 
be completed by mid-2020 (Kinanti, 2019).
Section II started its construction phase 
and is expected to operate in 2021. Section III 
faced a problem in terms of financing from the 
state budget and also land acquisition The fiscal 
alternative that can be done is to attract foreign 
investors. Later, The construction of the Serang-
Panimbang toll road section III was auctioned with 
a ceiling budget of IDR 4 trillion in the Electronic 
Procurement Service (LPSE) of the Ministry of 
Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR). The 
signing of the contract to the tender winner will 
be held in May 2020 (LPSE Kementrian Pekerjaan 
Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat, 2020). On the 
other hand, there is still 28% of land that has not 
been acquired for the section III toll road. There 
were approximately 300 parcels of land that were 
claimed to be owned by the Indonesian Army’s 
Headquarters and listed as their assets. 
The infrastructure is considered to be a 
guarantee to the progress of the Tanjung Lesung 
SEZ. Investors seem to be waiting for the toll 
road construction. One of the parties interested 
in investing in Tanjung Lesung SEZ, was the 
Managing Director of Sentul Circuit, Tinton 
Soeprapto. He was willing to invest in building 
a circuit at the Tanjung Lesung SEZ on condition 
that the toll road exist. According to him, the 
construction of the circuit in the Tanjung Lesung 
area was very potential, not only for future racing 
events but because the current Sentul Circuit 
schedule was too crowded. 
In addition to the toll road, the Pandeglang 
government also hoped that the construction of 
the South Banten Airport would be carried out 
soon. Airports and toll roads would bring in new 
growth centers and would increase financial 
viability in the region. The airport is one of the 
main requirements for the establishment of SEZ 
(Reddy & Reddy, 2007). Similar to the toll road, 
South Banten Airport was also constrained by 
land acquisition.
Waiting for incentives 
Economic zones generally encounter the 
same issues, such as fiscal incentives (Rodríguez-
Díaz & Rodríguez-Díaz, 2018). The government 
often faced a dilemma regarding the potential 
loss of state revenue from the tax sector if it 
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provided customs exemptions or tax relief. The 
government was also reluctant to provide full tax 
facilities (Utomo & Ragimun, 2019). Regarding 
the Tanjung Lesung SEZ, there was no incentive 
either from the provincial or district government. 
The district government worried that it would 
lose potential income if they provided incentives 
such as local taxes. Even though the lost benefits 
are usually short term. The government will 
reap far more benefits in the long term, such as 
employment and economic growth in the region 
and the surrounding area. This, of course, will lead 
to increased tax revenue potential. At the time of 
the study, the incentive for investing in Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ was no different from investing 
outside the region. 
After the tsunami, Pandeglang District 
Government did provide incentives for hotels 
and restaurants in the form of tax exemptions for 
six months in the recovery period. The district 
government loses IDR 200 million/month from 
local taxes collected from hotel and restaurant tax 
receipts. Not to mention other revenue from other 
sectors such as underground water extraction. 
The Pandeglang government actually gained 
more from PT BWJ, in the form of water, road, and 
electricity needs for several buffer zones. 
Regarding incentives, the Pandeglang 
district government and PT BWJ also highlighted 
the discourse of providing incentives in the 
draft omnibus law. PT BWJ agreed that the 
Administrator would be determined by the central 
government. As a note, the draft stated that 
incentives would be provided if the investment 
value is more than IDR 500 billion, while the 
amount of investment in the Tanjung Lesung SEZ 
is generally below IDR 500 billion.
The Pandeglang District government 
faced difficulties in implementing incentives. 
Their reason was that they could not keep up 
with the changes in regulation from the central 
government. Many rules changed before the region 
finished studying the old one. The discussion on 
incentives at the district level was also dragging 
on at the level of the Regional Representative 
Council (DPRD) of the district. According to the 
Pandeglang District government, at the time 
of the study, the regional incentives were in 
the Regional Legislation Program (Prolegda). 
The regional incentive regulation will later be 
combined with the new authority in the new 
government regulation regarding SEZ. This was 
done because producing a regional regulation 
requires a significant amount of money. 
Generally, the management of regional 
incentives was unevenly applied; sometimes 
applicants received different treatments. Regional 
incentives also had not been fully implemented, 
although through a regional regulation, the form, 
amount, and procedure for lessening, reducing, 
and exempting regional taxes and/or regional fees 
to business entities and/or business actors in SEZ 
could be regulated, as mandated by Government 
Regulation No. 12 of 2020, to provide certainty to 
business actors.
On the other hand, incentives at the central 
level for Tourism SEZs are still problematic because 
the central incentive scheme has supported the 
tourism sector. However, the new Government 
Regulation No. 12 of 2020 added tax facilities in 
the tourism SEZ in the form of customs and excise 
facilities for the inclusion of capital goods and 
raw materials to business operators in the SEZ 
Tourism. As such, in general, the taxation, customs, 
and excise facilities for the Tourism SEZ are on par 
with manufacturing SEZ facilities. However, this 
government regulation is still relatively new and 
has not yet been conveyed to the regions.
Land Issues
The slow development of the Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ was also due to land acquisition 
issues. According to some information, from 
the required 1500 hectares of land, only 1430 
hectares successfully acquired. Approximately 70 
hectares were having issues in land acquisition. 
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The delay in land acquisition was supposedly 
due to the conflict between PT. BWJ as a manager 
of the SEZ and the local community. Meanwhile, 
the government was considered too neutral  and 
unable to push for conflict resolution(Kartini, 
2019). Tensions related to a land acquisition 
between the community and PT BWJ often 
occurred (Faktabanten.co.id, 2018). 
At the time of the study, the land issue 
was over. PT BWJ gave land to the community 
to be occupied, and it allowed 200 hectares of 
agricultural land to be managed by the community 
in the form of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Some communities admitted that they 
have to pay around IDR. 150 thousand per 2000 
meters. According to PT. BWJ, communities who 
are in the SEZ area, received shelter and facilities, 
such as groundwater and free entry into the area 
for farmers and fishermen.
At the time of the study, only approximately 
158 hectares of land owned by PT. BWJ was 
developed. The development was targeted to be 
around 18 percent or around 278 hectares of 
the total area of  Tanjung Lesung SEZ. The area 
of  Tanjung Lesung SEZ that has the Rights to 
Build (HGB) permit was only 1,195 hectares. The 
Pandeglang District Government had brought the 
issue to the SEZ National Council in Jakarta. The 
National Council recommends that the land held 
by PT. BWJ was changed to only 1430 hectares. 
However, PT. BWJ did not agree. Their reason was 
that if the planned land area of  1500 hectares is 
reduced, it will reduce the impact of the initially 
planned investment of IDR 74 trillion.
To encourage the Tanjung Lesung SEZ, the 
central government targeted to develop regional 
infrastructures, such as the Serang-Tanjung 
Lesung national road, the Serang-Panimbang 
toll road (planned for completion in 2018), the 
South Banten Airport, and reactivation of the 
Rangkas Bitung-Labuan railroad (Siregar, 2019). 
Considering the country’s financial condition is 
in a deficit position, the target would certainly 
be constrained. For example, the construction of 
the Serang-Panimbang toll road, which originally 
targeted for completion in 2018, will be delayed 
to be fully operational in 2022, and at the time 
of the study was only at the auction stage. This 
target was a three years delay from what was 
previously expected to be completed at the end 
of 2019(Indraini, 2020). 
Poor Coordination
The slow development of the Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ is also inseparable from the lack of 
coordination between the Regional Council under 
the province, and the SEZ Administrator under 
the district. The Secretariat of the SEZ National 
Council admitted that the Zone Council has not 
been able to assist the National Council. The Zone 
Council has not been able to take inventory of the 
issues and resolve strategic issues in the field. 
Many problems in the field should be able to be 
resolved by the Zone Council. Instead, several 
issues within the Administrator or in the regions 
were immediately escalated to the National 
Council.
The Banten Provincial Tourism Office as the 
Zone Council did not conduct coaching or assisted 
SEZ administrators. Coordination with the 
Regional Council was also rarely conducted, only 
once a year during the financial and development 
supervision reviews.
Coordination problems also occurred 
related to licensing (Wahyuni et al., 2013). In 
some cases, SEZ Administrators, who had to issue 
technical recommendations within the area, still 
had to deal with local technical offices, although 
the Administrator was given various delegations 
of authority.  As a result, this condition impeded 
the licensing process. For example, in the case 
of granting groundwater management permits, 
it still requires a technical study from the local 
technical office.
In addition to the coordination problem, 
at the provincial level, the Banten Bapeda had a 
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contrasting opinion with the Tourism Office about 
the SEZ. Banten Bappeda considered that the 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ has made no progress and 
was more supportive of the Banten Governor’s 
statement that it should be dissolved. In contrast, 
the Banten Tourism Office considered that 
the Tanjung Lesung SEZ had an impact on the 
economic growth outside the zone. According to 
Banten Province Bappeda, the report made by PT. 
BWJ every year showed almost no change. They 
always provided the same report, the construction 
seemed stagnant and showed no progress. On 
the other hand, in several events attended by the 
Governor of Banten, the Director of PT BWJ never 
attended and only assigned his subordinates. He 
thought that was the reason why the governor 
was upset. Also, the Banten Bappeda did not see 
the realization of the MoU carried out by PT.  BWJ 
and its investors. The investor data was only a 
formality.
The Banten Bappeda considered the problem 
was not due to the provincial government, but it 
was the PT BWJ problem that has the difficulty of 
attracting visitors. According to the Bappeda, the 
development of national and provincial roads to 
locations was also not matched by developments 
within the zone. That was also apparent when we 
visited the location. From the entrance gate, the 
road in the SEZ area was not in good condition and 
was flooded despite some not-so-heavy rainfall. 
On the right and left of the road, the weeds grew 
wild. Some faded investment invitation banners 
were seen in some corners (Pakdeenurit et al., 
2014). 
The Banten Provincial Tourism Office 
admitted that the development of the Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ was indeed constrained. However, 
it did not mean the provincial government did 
not do anything. As the Secretary of the Zone 
Council, which was given a direct mandate by the 
Governor, the Banten Tourism Office did various 
things to boost the visit there According to him, 
the provincial government always collaborated 
with PT BWJ, for example, when the government 
organized festivals there. In the past year, the 
government held several festivals in the SEZ area. 
But according to Bappeda Banten, the festival was 
not too attractive for visitors. For example, the 
Tanjung Lesung Festival, which was held together 
with the Pandeglang District Government, was 
unable to attract visitors. Some Small and Medium 
Industry (IKM) players who opened a stall there 
complained about the lack of visitors.
The Role of The Home Affairs Ministry 
The Ministry of Home Affairs, as regulated 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 
43 of 2015, plays a role in implementing Special 
Economic Zone policies in the Directorate of 
Regions, Urban and State Boundaries.  The Special 
Economic Zones is attached to the Sub-Directorate 
of Special Zone Scope I, while the functions of the 
Sub-Directorate is in preparing policy formulation 
materials, implementing policies, providing 
guidance, conducting monitoring and supervision, 
as well as conducting monitoring, evaluations, 
and reporting in the field of general supervision 
of the SEZ.
The Ministry of Home Affairs is also 
mandated by Law No. 39/2009 and Perpres 
No. 33/2010 as one of the members of the SEZ 
National Council with the Directorate General 
of Territorial Administration as one of the 
Implementation Teams. At the moment, the 
regulative policies issued by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs are regulations that generally govern 
permits, regions, and borders. 
This was similar to what was stated by 
(Alexianu et al., 2019) that no government 
body was specifically formed to support the 
implementation of SEZ policies. The SEZ policy 
interventions in the regions were varied, not 
only emphasizing regional aspects, but also the 
regional financial aspects, the implementation of 
programs and activities, and the organization of 
regional apparatuses. For these three aspects, the 
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Ministry of Home Affairs has various Directorate 
Generals, including the Directorate General of 
Regional Financial Development to oversee the 
implementation of regional taxes and levies, the 
Directorate General of Regional Development for 
evaluating programs and activities in regional 
development planning, and the Directorate 
General of Regional Autonomy to oversee 
organizing regional apparatus. 
At the time of the study, SEZ management 
was under the coordination of the Directorate 
General of Regional Administration However, the 
limitations of the structure and substance of the 
policy need to be addressed. Furthermore, the 
Directorate General of Regional Development 
Supervision and the Directorate General of 
Regional Financial Development Supervision 
oversee the substance of the policies related 
to SEZ to ensure that it would be carried 
out properly, with or without the role of the 
Directorate General of Regional Administration. 
 Overseeing the financial policies and regional 
incentives would be quite difficult to be conducted 
optimally by the Directorate General of Regional 
Financial Development Supervision due to the 
high load of work in that Directorate  (Gudkov 
et al., 2017). The Ministry of Home Affairs never 
received a progress report from the Tanjung 
Lesung SEZ. As a result, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs did not have the necessary information 
to provide policy improvements. The difficulty in 
getting data was due to bureaucracy. The Ministry 
of Home Affairs must ask permission from the 
Coordinating Ministry for the Economy as the 
KEK National Council to request the data. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the function of supervision 
and guidance carried out by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs on the region is not effective (Damuri et 
al., 2019).
As a member of the SEZ National Council, the 
Ministry of Home Affairs also briefly supervised 
the Banten provincial government. To accelerate 
development, the Directorate General of Regional 
Administration (Ditjen Adwil) of the Banten 
Provincial Government was responsible for 
completing the construction of the 33-kilometer 
Section III toll road (Cileles-Panimbang). However, 
the Banten provincial government complained 
about that, because the regional fiscal capacity 
was lacking to build the Section III toll road.
The Ditjen Adwil considered that the 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ had no appeal because its 
management was unable to conduct the regional 
branding. Many ways could be conducted by the 
SEZ, such as established transit points in the Anyer 
area and developed sea transportation to the 
SEZ. These methods were carried out by several 
tourist destinations, such as from Lombok to Gili 
Trawangan. Transit points would automatically 
encourage tourism activities. There would be no 
need to wait for toll roads, that costs a lot of money 
and takes a long time to construct(Hutomo, 2018).
Tanjung Lesung SEZ issues were also 
related to authority. The regional government, 
where the SEZ located, was not actively involved. 
They were only involved concerning the location 
and land acquisition, while the master plan and 
development planning were left entirely to the 
SEZ management. In reality, development within 
the zone was often different from the masterplan. 
Tanjung Lesung SEZ, for example, shifted its 
focus from the original focus on the sea to land 
management (Banten, 2017). This shows the 
weak coordination between government and 
management.  As a result, regional development 
commitments were not a shared responsibility. 
Instead, it created a heightened conflict between 
the regional government where the SEZ located, 
and the SEZ business entities.
The weak coordination was not only 
between the regional government and the business 
entities but also between the regional government 
and the SEZ National Council. Pemerintah daerah 
menganggap pemerintah pusat ingin memegang 
kendali kawasan, tanpa melibatkan pemerintah 
daerah, although the regional government had to 
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prepare other supporting facilities when the SEZ 
area was determined. The regional government 
also did not have a sense of ownership to the 
SEZ and did not have a comprehensive picture of 
the impact of investments made in the zone and 
outside the zone for the region’s development 
progress (Aritenang, 2017). 
Conclusion
Nearly a decade after the establishment 
of the SEZ, Tanjung Lesung SEZ has not shown 
the expected development. Despite the poor 
performance of the Tanjung Lesung SEZ, the 
supporting activities in tourism have developed 
in the surrounding area. It increases employment 
opportunities, the mobility of people, goods, and 
services, along with improving the accessibility 
of the region. Tanjung Lesung SEZ is still waiting 
for support and improvement in terms of 
infrastructure (accessibility, human resources, 
and security), increasing resilience (construction 
of coastal safeguards, evacuation buildings, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction), and the 
sustainable side (development of tourist villages 
and ecotourism).
There are at  least three important 
characteristics that require the government’s 
attention in creating an SEZ.  First, the SEZ must be 
able to provide relief in tariff and tax policies that 
are far more attractive than those outside the SEZ. 
Ease of licensing will also be a determining factor in 
boosting the investment value in SEZs. Second, SEZs 
need to be supported with superior infrastructure 
or exclusive access. Third, SEZs need professional 
support from all lines of government.
This study shows that the provincial 
government as the Zone Council has not been 
managed effectively. Ideally, the provincial 
government should have a more optimal role in 
resolving constraints in terms of infrastructure 
and accessibility, incentive guarantees, land issues, 
and synergy management with its resources and 
capabilities. The Ministry of Home Affairs, as 
a member of the National Council, should also 
be able to have a more optimal role. Internally, 
under the coordination of the Directorate General 
of Territorial Administration Supervision, an 
SEZ Working Group can be formed to facilitate 
the regional and central interests in terms of 
financing and incentives, strengthening the human 
resources of the administration and institutions, 
as well as the SEZ organizations, as well as 
supervision and control. 
 Next, review PP No. 18 of 2016 concerning 
Regional Organizations, especially to support a 
professional SEZ institution. It means that there 
must be a mutual agreement to regulate the 
position of SEZ administrators to ensure that the 
administrator would be able to be more focused 
and professional.  Finally, tourism SEZs need to 
maintain their local identity. The local identity 
is a unique characteristic of the SEZ that must 
be maintained. Do not set aside and forget the 
SEZ local characteristic and local wisdom of the 
area when the competition becomes fierce. The 
regional governments need to be at the forefront 
to bring local wisdom into the global arena.
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